*The precariousness of the UK\'s global health leadership*

The UK is a global health leader {#newe12201-sec-0002}
================================

Since the concept of 'health security' first came into parlance with the reconceptualisation of HIV/AIDS as a security threat,[1](#newe12201-note-0001){ref-type="fn"} the UK has been a leader on global health security. This position was solidified by the broader movement towards the securitisation of non‐traditional security threats post 9/11 (and indeed the anthrax attacks).[2](#newe12201-note-0002){ref-type="fn"}

The UK\'s normative leadership on infectious disease control was clearest in the development and implementation of the coherent 'Health is Global' strategy,[3](#newe12201-note-0003){ref-type="fn"} which was the first to recognise infectious disease as a threat to national and international economic security. While this has been criticised as self‐interest -- to protect the UK from infection, while opening trade opportunities[4](#newe12201-note-0004){ref-type="fn"} -- this policy priority has served as a blueprint for governments across the globe, in the development of their pandemic preparedness policies.

Beyond this, the UK has been pivotal in developing capacity and governance for responding to infectious disease across the world. Public Health England has a global team instigating ongoing bilateral projects with numerous low‐ and middle‐income countries to build surveillance, detection and response capacity, as well as participating in the World Health Organization\'s (WHO\'s) Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN)."**"the UK has been pivotal in developing capacity and governance for responding to infectious disease across the world"**"

This ability of the UK to lead has been strengthened by its National Health Service (NHS). Recently, Dr Tedros Ghebreyesus has advocated universal health coverage as a strategy to deliver on global health security.[5](#newe12201-note-0005){ref-type="fn"} In this respect, the NHS, providing healthcare free at the point of access, is the envy of many in the world. This has been the UK government\'s 'trump card' in establishing its global health leadership -- by providing an exemplar of what is possible if governments invest in access to healthcare. Through this, the UK has been able to export models of working, technical expertise and even human resources to other parts of the world, demonstrating the strength of its integrated health system, a key part of which is infection control.

It has further strengthened by the UK\'s status as a major funder of global health activities. It is one of the only countries to have 0.7 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) earmarked for overseas development assistance in legislation,[6](#newe12201-note-0006){ref-type="fn"} the majority of which is spent on health. The UK is the second largest donor to the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria[7](#newe12201-note-0007){ref-type="fn"} and it has committed significant funds to the World Bank\'s International Development Association replenishment. These structural elements are then rapidly deployed by the UK in an outbreak response. For example, during the ebola outbreak in West Africa:epidemiologists from Public Health England worked closely with the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Health[8](#newe12201-note-0008){ref-type="fn"}the Ministry of Defence deployed UK military to build treatment centres[9](#newe12201-note-0009){ref-type="fn"}NHS staff volunteered as healthcare workers[10](#newe12201-note-0010){ref-type="fn"}the Department for International Development supported clinical trials of vaccines, in collaboration with UK universities.

In addition, UK Public Health Rapid Support Team is frequently deployed around the world to support response efforts for emerging pathogens.[11](#newe12201-note-0011){ref-type="fn"}

Yet, it departed from the global approach {#newe12201-sec-0003}
=========================================

There is a tension between the UK\'s historic leadership in global health security and the significant domestic failures on Covid‐19. Despite the UK\'s role in defining global health security, the government chose to depart from the global approach. For example, in March 2020, the UK decided that the WHO\'s recommended strategy -- based on test, isolate and contact trace -- did not apply to the UK.[12](#newe12201-note-0012){ref-type="fn"} Yet Jenny Harries, deputy chief medical officer, had stated: "The clue with the WHO is in its title -- it\'s a World Health Organisation, and it is addressing all countries across the world."[13](#newe12201-note-0013){ref-type="fn"} "**"there is a tension between the UK\'s historic leadership in global health security and the contemporary failures for Covid‐19 domestically"**"

It is now evident that such 'British exceptionalism' misplaced. It has ultimately caused significant infection, numerous additional deaths and widespread disruption to the economy.

Particularly problematic was the government\'s indecision on whether to prioritise containing the virus (as other governments prioritised and as per WHO recommendations), or to delay and move towards developing national herd immunity proactively (against WHO advice). This political indecision, or indeed lack of decision owing to a lacuna in capacity to effectively contain the virus, now means the UK is one the worst affected locations globally.

This is at odds with the UK\'s track record in disease control. In 2019, the UK came second globally in the Global Health Security Index\'s assessment of capacity to respond to outbreaks.[14](#newe12201-note-0014){ref-type="fn"} Yet, such measurements of policy tools and response mechanisms fail to assess political prioritisation or financial neglect. Yes, the UK does have an exceptional disease response system on paper, but politics has left it bereft of funding and implementability."**"the UK does have an exceptional disease response system on paper, but politics has left it bereft of funding and implementability"**"

Departing from global standards was driven by bad politics, not bad science {#newe12201-sec-0004}
===========================================================================

It is strange that the UK -- a global health leader -- did not follow global health advice, with severe consequences. While the government claim their decisions have followed the science, closer examination reveals that our outcomes have been determined by bad politics, rather than bad evidence.

The failure of our Covid‐19 strategy exposes a pattern of complacency lasting years. The last major outbreaks to affect the UK were bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in the early 1990s and the foot and mouth outbreak in 2001. Even when Pauline Cafferkey became the UK\'s first case of Ebola in 2016, rigorous infection control protocol meant this would never pose a major issue to UK security. It appears that these near misses gave government a false sense of security. That is, despite pandemics featuring in name at the top of the UK\'s National Risk Register,[15](#newe12201-note-0015){ref-type="fn"} the UK government became complacent to the real risk of pandemics, and subsequently failed to ensure the practical readiness of the established protocols.

In the case of Covid‐19, this was amplified by competing political priorities, such as continued austerity implemented by successive UK governments and, of course, Brexit. Exercise Cygnus -- a real world simulation of a British disease outbreak ‐ highlighted gaps in the UK\'s pandemic response. Yet, the continued underfunding of the NHS has meant that while a need for surge capacity was identified ‐ in personal protective equipment (PPE), ventilators and intensive care unit beds -- the extra resource was not purchased.[16](#newe12201-note-0016){ref-type="fn"} They fell victim to the same programme of 'efficiency cuts' that has seen NHS funding and public health services rolled back.[17](#newe12201-note-0017){ref-type="fn"}

The short sightedness of the latter is now particularly clear. The UK government\'s reduction in investment in public health prevention, such as in smoking, alcohol and obesity,[18](#newe12201-note-0018){ref-type="fn"} has not only led to entirely preventable chronic conditions, but also these conditions are now proving to be significant risk factors for coronavirus.

The political prioritisation of Brexit has further challenged domestic health security. It appears that:training for keyworkers to manage a pandemic was stalled for contingency plans around no‐deal Brexitthe UK missed opportunities for European Union‐level purchasing of PPE[19](#newe12201-note-0019){ref-type="fn"}parliamentary enquiries into preparedness for infectious disease were delayed, and eventually halted due to the 2019 general election.[20](#newe12201-note-0020){ref-type="fn"}

It\'s clear that political goals trumped those of pandemic preparedness.

Can the UK remain a global leader on health security after Covid‐19? {#newe12201-sec-0005}
====================================================================

This gap between the UK\'s role in promoting internationalist visions of infectious disease control globally, and its inability to control a pandemic at home, is stark. This makes for an interesting future in global health security, and brings into question the role of UK soft‐power and leadership."**"This gap between the UK\'s role in promoting internationalist visions of infectious disease control globally, and its inability to control a pandemic at home, is stark"**"

In an effort to try to maintain its position, the UK government has taken steps to ensure its future leadership role. It has committed to:ensuring funding to the WHO (for which it is now the world\'s largest state funder with the withdrawal of the United States)the hosting of a global vaccine summit in June[21](#newe12201-note-0021){ref-type="fn"}renewing its commitment to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance[22](#newe12201-note-0022){ref-type="fn"}continuing to fund the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI).

However, while these public statements might be important to project UK leadership, they do not demonstrate a significant gear change for UK activity in terms of the global fight against Covid‐19. That is, the UK is merely doing what it had previously done. It is not launching new initiatives or policy that would demonstrate increased ambitions.

This is important -- the global health landscape is being rapidly transformed, not only by the response to Covid‐19, but also through the apparent shifting balance of power away from the United States amid the pandemic. The Trump administration appears committed to blowing up all internationalist activity, challenging the WHO to reform within 30 days (a process the WHO has been undertaking for a decade without success due to governments being unwilling to give the organisation more money or more power).[23](#newe12201-note-0023){ref-type="fn"} ^,^ [24](#newe12201-note-0024){ref-type="fn"} Simultaneously, China is entering multilateral activities with more gusto than previously, and for how long and in what capacity remains to be seen. This could be the perfect opportunity for the UK to exert dominance in this space.

There is every chance that this will be an agenda worth leading on. Not only is there likely to be increased political importance placed on health security in a post‐Covid‐19 era, but also Covid‐19 is tied up in environmental disaster and climate change. These could cause future outbreaks, tying global health and global climate policy together. In January 2019, the World Economic Forum noted this, alongside new analysis showing acceleration in the number of 'major disease' outbreaks being faced by the world.[25](#newe12201-note-0025){ref-type="fn"}

Moreover, global health security could be the perfect domain for the UK to show its commitment to a 'Global Britain'. Given the reputational impact of Brexit, such opportunities are important for our international reputation.

But, with more than 50,000 deaths in the UK due to coronavirus and 250,000 cases, the UK is not demonstrating the necessary normative leadership in health at home. Mixed messaging from the government to "stay alert" to end lockdown will likely end in a second wave of the epidemic appearing. Once again, the UK government will be forced to make decisions between economic and health security.

Given its departure from global solidarity approaches to the Covid response, leading to system‐wide failures, why would any international government seek the UK\'s advice again?
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